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N EGOTIATIONS TO UPDATE many of the transporta-
tion conventions have been conducted recently by special-
ized United Nations (U.N.) agencies such as the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO), and the United Commission on In-
ternational Trade Laws (UNCITRAL). The ICAO provides
the forum for amendment of the Warsaw Convention on the
liability of air carriers, and the Rome Convention on surface
damage.1 The IMO is the forum for amendment of several
maritime liability treaties.' The UNCITRAL is known for its
revision of the maritime bill of lading which led to the 1978
U.N. Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg
*Adjunct Professor Of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. United States
Representative to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Working Group on International Negotiable Instruments, Twelfth Session, Vienna,
Jan. 4-15, 1982, and member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Fifteenth Session, New York, from July 26,
to August 6, 1982. This paper should not, in any way, be attributed to any organiza-
tion or agency with which the author is currently associated.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Warsaw, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, October 7, 1952 [hereinafter cited as Rome
Convention].
a International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London,
1969. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of
Sea-Going Ships, Brussels, 1957. See Annex A for a list of Transportation conven-
tions and protocols which are relevant to UNCITRAL's work on limitation of
amounts.
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Rules).'
In 1982, UNCITRAL convened4 a working group to con-
sider the establishment of constant liability limits for all the
international conventions on liability, including the air law
conventions. This author was the United States representative
to the negotiations, which reached a conclusion at the plenary
meeting of UNCITRAL during July and August of 1982, at
the United Nations in New York.5 UNCITRAL is singularly
suited to resolve international trade problems that cut across
the various modes of transportation. It was created in 1966 by
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) for the specific
purpose of unifying and harmonizing international trade law,
thereby facilitating international trade. The General Assem-
bly gave UNCITRAL the task of promoting uniformity of law
among the nations.' One of the main purposes of transporta-
tion conventions, such as the Warsaw Convention and the
C United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc., A/
CONF.89/13 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Hamburg Rules].
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the
Work of its Eleventh Session, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 67, U.N. Doc. A/33/17
(1978); Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the
Work of its Fourteenth Session, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 32 U.N. Doc. A/36/
17 (1981).See Report of the Working Group on International Negotiable Instruments
on the Work of its Twelfth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/215 (1982). [hereinafter Work-
ing Group Report].
' Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the
Work of its Fifteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/230 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ple-
nary Report].
m G. A. Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6313 (1966)
mandated that:
The Commission shall further the progressive harmonization and uni-
fication of the law of international trade by: (a) Co-ordinating the
work of organizations active in this field and encouraging co-operation
among them; (b) Promoting wider participation in existing interna-
tional conventions and wider accceptance of existing model and uni-
form laws; (c) Preparing or promoting the adoption of new interna-
tional conventions, model laws and uniform laws and promoting the
codification and wider acceptance of international trade terms, provi-
sions, customs and practices, in collaboration, where appropriate, with
the organizations operating in this field; (d) Promoting ways and
means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and application of interna-





Hamburg Rules, 8 is to unify laws. Therefore, UNCITRAL was
a likely forum for resolving problems of inflation which are
common to all transportation liability conventions.
Because UNCITRAL is one of the least known of the U.N.
bodies, a brief description of its operating format is in order.
The thirty-six member countries of UNCITRAL are elected
by the General Assembly. They represent all geographic re-
gions. 9 A large number of other states, however, participate as
observers. In addition, intergovernmental and non-govern-
mental organizations send observers to UNCITRAL meetings
to participate in the discussions. Recently, the headquarters
of UNCITRAL was moved to Vienna, Austria. UNCITRAL
accomplishes it work by establishing working groups to focus
on particular topics proposed and approved by the Commis-
sion. All of the members convene annually to consider the
work of these groups and to plan new work. UNCITRAL's
work product appears in one of three forms: (1) draft conven-
tions for which the U.N. General Assembly is asked to con-
vene diplomatic conferences; (2) models for international or
national legislation; or (3) arbitration and conciliation rules
intended for use by private parties.
Examples of UNCITRAL's achievements in international
trade law are the 1978 Hamburg Rules,10 the 1974 Convention
on the Limitation Period in International Sale of Goods,1 the
1980 U.N. Convention on Contracts for International Sale of
Goods,1 and the Rules on Conciliation and Arbitration." UN-
I See Hamburg Rules, supra note 3. The Hamburg Rules significantly change a
prior treaty on the maritime bill of lading: the International Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea,
Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Rules], implemented in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § §1300-1350
(1976).
9 G.A. Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
provided for a membership of 29 states elected by the Assembly. G.A. Res. 3108, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 145, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) increased the Commis-
ion's membership from 29 states to 36 states. The United States is a member of
UNCITRAL.
10 Hamburg Rules, supra note 3.
1 Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, U.N. at
101, U.N. Do. A/Conf. 6/15 (1974).
Is Convention on ,Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, [1982], XI V.B.
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CITRAL is currently working on conventions, international
bills of exchange, promissory notes, international checks, and
a review of electronic transfer of funds. The Commission is
also working on a legal guide on contractual provisions for
supply and construction of large industrial works, and model
laws and guidelines on international commercial arbitration."
At its eleventh session UNCITRAL adopted a French pro-
posal to "study ways of establishing a system for determining
a universal unit of constant value which would serve as a
point of reference in international (transport and liability)
conventions for expressing amounts in monetary terms. ' "
The proposal was assigned to UNCITRAL's Working Group
on International Negotiable Instruments (the Working Group)
which most recently met in Vienna, Austria, during January
of 1982.16 The Group was composed of representatives from
Chile, Egypt, France, India, Nigeria, the United Soviet Social-
ist Republic (USSR), the United Kingdom and the United
States of America. The unit of account clauses in private in-
ternational law treaties, 7 (including the Warsaw Convention,
Hamburg Rules, and the Multimodal Convention), were ex-
amined by the Group. A significant development at the meet-
ing was a stated shift in position by the USSR, which opened
the way for amendment of the unit of account clauses by
eliminating the current system of calculating liability in both
Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and in gold.' This shift ena-
UNCITRAL at 151, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex I. See Winship, New Rules for
International Sales, A.B.A. J., Oct, 1982, at 1230, and Prof. John 0. Honnold's essays
on this subject in Honnold, 18 Am. J. Comp. L., 223 (1979).
11 G.A. Reas. 31/98, Dec. 15 1976; G.A. Res. 35/52, Dec. 4, 1980.
1 Plenary Report, supra note 5.
'B United Nations General Assembly, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17 (A33/17) at
para. 67 (1978).
SWorking Group Report, supra note 4.
" See Annex A.
Working Group Report, supra note 4, at Annex. The SDR is based on a
weighted average of five currencies (dollar, yen, pound sterling, Franch franc, and
DM). The SDR has considerable stability. To a limited extent the five currencies in
the "basket" counteract inflation of any one of the currencies. The general world in-
flation, however, erodes all five currencies and, therefore, also erodes the SDR. Unit
of Account of Constant Value, Report of the UNCITRAL Secretary General, A/
CN.9WG.IV/WP.27 (Nov. 23, 1981).
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bled the Group to recommend adoption of SDRs as its sole
unit of calculation. Alternative ways of preventing erosion of
the liability limits in the transportation conventions were also
recommended.1 ' After considering these recommendations at
its July-August meeting in New York, UNICTRAL adopted a
new SDR unit of account treaty article and two alternative
provisions for adjusting liability limits.20 These provisions
may benefit air law conventions, such as the Warsaw and
Rome Conventions, as well as other private international law
treaties.21 This paper describes these recommendations with
particular emphasis on their significance to air law.
I. UNIT OF ACCOUNT CLAUSE
A. Recent Problems of Denoting Liability Limits in Gold
and Special Drawing Rights
Courts in the U.S. and many other countries disagree as to
whether limits on liability for transportation are to be deter-
mined according to the market value of gold or the old official
value of gold.22 Because there is no international agreement
on official gold value in force today, and gold is generally not
considered to be an acceptable international unit of account,
the controversy persists. Although states may place an official
value on gold under national law such values do not have
binding international effect.
Because of the uncertainty surrounding computation of lia-
bility limits, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit com-
pletely removed the limitation on liability in international air
carriage in a recently issued decision, Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc..21 The case involved a claim by
Franklin Mint against Trans World Airlines (TWA) for dam-
" Id. at pares. 54 and 90.
so Plenary Report, aupra note 5, at 13-17.
21 See Rome Convention, supra, note 1.
22 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982)
Par Value Modification Act, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) [formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 449
(1973)], froze the price at $42.22 per troy ounce of gold. See infra notes 22-23.
23 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3883 (June 13, 1983).
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ages resulting from the loss of crates containing numismatic
materials weighing 714 pounds. TWA argued that its liability
was limited by Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention to 250
Poincare gold francs per kilogram." Previously, that limit had
been upheld by the United States.25
When the United States joined the Warsaw Convention in
1934, the gold franc was converted into dollars at $35 per
ounce of gold. That conversion rate was then required by the
United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934.26 The United States
continued to maintain the value of United States dollars in
terms of gold until it abolished the official price of gold by
repealing the 1972 Par Value Modification Act, effective April
1, 1978.27
In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit held that repeal of
the Act terminated an official value of gold and thus the War-
saw $20 limit.28 The court permitted TWA to be governed by
this limit because the carrier had relied on the limit when
purchasing insurance. The court further stated, however, that
events occurring sixty days from the date the decision became
final would not be subject to this or any other limit.29
At trial, Franklin Mint had argued that the market value of
gold should be used to compute the Warsaw Convention lia-
bility limits.80 Its argument was that the drafters of Warsaw
intended to base the Convention on the most stable currency
measure in existence when the Convention was negotiated in
1929-gold. The United States conversion at $35 an ounce of
"4 Id. at 305. The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, Article 22, provides that the
carrier's liability for carriage of goods is limited to the sum of 250 francs per kilo-
gram. A franc is defined as consisting of 651/ milligram gold of millesimal fineness
900. Id. The limitation of liability for carriage of passengers is limited to the sum of
125,000 francs for each passenger. Id.
" See, e.g., Boenringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
" U.S. Gold Reserve Act of 1935, 48 Stat. 337 (19,4).
17 90 Stat. 2660, 2661 (1976). Congress retained use of gold for the purpose of es-
tablishing the value of gold certificates. 31 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. V 1981). Gold,
SDRS, Gold and Currencies, I.M.F. Pamphlet No. 26 at 40-41.
" Franklin Mint, 690 F. 2d at 309.
2 Id. at 311-12.
30 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World' Airlines, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), a/i'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982).
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gold into dollars was a subsequent monetary development un-
related to the treaty.81 At that market value of gold, the liabil-
ity limit would be approximately $220 per kilograms' under
Franklin Mint's argument.83 The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that demonetization of gold had eliminated gold as
an effective currency measure.u The market value of gold was
thought by the court to be too "gross" a departure from the
intended purpose of Warsaw.8
The court briefly considered use of the current French franc
to express liability limits, but quickly rejected this alternative
because the drafters of the Warsaw Convention had rejected a
tie-in with any national currency. Such a tie-in would have
made the Convention dependent on the French national econ-
omy. The Warsaw diplomatic conference explicitly selected a
gold-based currency, the Poincare gold franc, which is a dif-
ferent currency unit than the French franc."
As an alternative to using the official price of gold, TWA
had argued that the liability limits be expressed according to
SDR's, the monetary unit of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). 7 There is precedent for this in air law. In 1975, the
Montreal Protocols to the Warsaw Convention converted the
liability limits into SDRs. 8
The SDR limits of the Montreal Protocols, however, are not
yet in force. Although they were approved by the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, the Protocols did not receive the
necessary two-thirds vote and were defeated in the full Senate
by a vote of 50-42 in their favor on March 28, 1983.11 Ratifica-
81 Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 307.
" Current market value of gold. The price fluctuates.
u Franklin Mint, 690 F. 2d at 309-10.
8 Id.
" Id. at 310.
" Two recent French decisions have converted Poincare gold francs into current
French francs; See Chamie v. Egyptair, Cours d'appel, Paris, Jan. 31, 1980, and Paki-
stan Int'l Airlines v. Compagnie Air Int'l, Cours d'appel, Aix-en-Provence, Oct. 31,
1981. Franklin Mint, 690 F. 2d 309-10.
81 Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 310.
u See Montreal Protocol No.4, ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-3-4 (1975). Four Protocols to
the Warsaw Convention were adopted by the 1975 Montreal diplomatic conference.
" Only Protocols Nos. 3 and 4 were submitted for Senate approval. Ratification of
Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 and 4 is supported by air carriers and shippers. The Amer-
1983]
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tion by thirty countries is necessary before the Montreal Pro-
tocols enter into force.'0
Although the Protocols are not in force, some foreign courts
have already made a judicial conversion of gold francs into
SDR's.4 1 The Second Circuit, however, declined to adopt the
SDR limits by judicial fiat.4" The court attributed the "inter-
national disarray as to the proper unit of conversion under the
Convention" to the repeal of the 1972 Par Value Modification
Act and the abolition of the official value of gold by the
United States.4' By implication, the court concluded that
Congress had intended to abandon the Convention's system of
conversion into dollars, and thus render "the Convention's
limits on liability for loss of cargo. . . unenforceable in the
United States Courts."
The Franklin Mint decision has a number of important
consequences: (1) the immediate effect is that the limits on
liability for carriage under the Convention have been judi-
cially removed in at least the Second Circuit;' (2) the Frank-
lin Mint decision may channel Warsaw claims into the Second
Circuit thus resulting in forum shopping; (3) the decision has
significantly increased the pressure on the Montreal Proto-
cols; 46 (4) the decision exposes the airlines to additional risk
against of carriage because it creates uncertainty about the
nature of the risk against which airlines should insure. Their
only recourse is to insure against unlimited liability.47
ican Bar Association expressed support for ratification at its 1982 annual conference.
However, the American Trial Lawyers Association opposes ratification. 68 A.B.A.J.
1204 (1982).
40 Montreal Protocol No. 4, ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-3-4 (1975), supra note 38, Article
18, requires 30 ratifications for entry into force.
41 See U.K. Carriage by Air Order of 1980, Statutory Instrument No. 281, effective
March 21, 1980. See Lloyd's Maritime Law Newsletter, 1 Oct. 1981, for the most
recent adjustment of sterling by reference to the SDR value of gold francs converted
into sterling.
4' Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 310-11.
"3 Id. at 311.
44 Id.
48 Id. 311-12.
4"Id. Boenringer Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan American World Airways, 531 F.
Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
4, Martin, The Franklin Mint Case - A European Viewpoint, Lloyd's Aviation
Law 3 (1982). Mr. Martin states that the Franklin Mint decision has caused such
UNCITRAL-LIABILITY LIMITS
The continuing disparity between the market and the offi-
cial price of gold heightens the necessity of establishing effec-
tive uniform international units of account. Franklin Mint
provides a dramatic backdrop for the work of UNCITRAL on
a new unit of account treaty article. A stable, uniform mea-,
surement of liability is badly needed. UNCITRAL has devel-
oped such a measurement.
Anticipating the demonetization of gold, the 1975 diplo-
matic conference on the Warsaw Convention adopted four
protocols that expressed liability limits in SDR's for the first
time. 8 Subsequently, other transportation conventions were
amended to express liability limits in units of account identi-
cal to SDR's.4' A special monetary unit equivalence to gold
was retained for the countries which are not members of the
IMF, namely the USSR and most other communist nations.50
Several new conventions incorporated the unit of account
clause that appears in Article 26 of the Hamburg Rules, which
is a modified version of the Unit of Account Clause found in
the four Warsaw protocols. "1 Therefore, the Working Group
began its discussion by focusing on Article 26.52
Article 26(1) of the Hamburg Rules provides that SDR's are
the unit of account used to express liability limits. Limitations
expressed in a national currency are calculated according to a
valuation by the IMF. As previously noted, an alternative con-
version is allowed for states which are not members of the
IMF. Articles 26(2) and (3) establish a gold equivalency for
uncertainty about liability limits in international air carriage that he would not ad-
vise any airline or insurer to rely on established limitations of liability for either cargo
or passengers. He believes that contractual limits established pursuant to CAB Order
74-1-16 could be interpreted as a contractual provision tending to lower liability lim-
its fixed by the Warsaw Convention. Such a reduction of limits could be found to
violate Article 23 which declares null and void any provision tending to lower the
Convention's limits.
' Report of the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the International
Conference on Air Law held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, Montreal, September, 1975, at 12 [hereinafter United States Delegation
Report].
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the liability limits of such non-member states. Limits are ex-
pressed in monetary units which are equivalent to the gold
content of the old Poincare gold franc. Monetary units are
converted into the non-member national currency according
to the national law of the non-member states. Article 26(4)
does provide, however, that the conversion "be made in such a
manner as to express in the national currency of the con-
tracting state as far as possible the same real value . . . " as
expressed in SDR's." States must inform the United Nations
of the manner used to calculate their national currency
equivalency in monetary units." Subsequent changes must
also be reported.55 Non-members of the IMF, such as the
USSR, who might otherwise resist calculating their currencies
to resemble the value of the SDR, have come to acquiesce in
the dual system of calculating liability limits in the transpor-
tation area, because they fear that if they decline to do so,
courts may use the market value of gold to estimate liability
limits.
The dual system of calculating limits in Article 26 is imper-
fect because it undercuts the desirable goals of predictability
and uniformity. The liability limits of the non-IMF members
are not perfectly predictable because when SDR's are con-
verted into a national currency according to national law, the
currency values can be influenced by the economic policy of a
particular country." It is sometimes possible to purchase such
currencies on the free market for less than the official value of
currency stated by countries. A single system of calculating
liability limits would reduce the magnitude of these problems
by providing uniformity.
Transported goods are generally insured under two separate
insurance systems. The carriers purchase liability insurance
and the shippers acquire cargo insurance to cover the risk as-
signed to them by various transportation conventions. The
63 Hamburg Rules, supra note 3, Art. 26(4).
e4 Id.
63 Id.
" As reflected in the United States Delegation Report, supra note 48, the USSR
was concerned with the currency conversion process in the United States.
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two concurrent insurance systems compliment each other
when the liability limits are clearly defined. Effective co-exis-
tence, however, will be upset if the market value of gold is
used to measure liability. For carriers, the resultant higher
cost of insurance may cause higher transportation costs. While
it would appear that higher carrier insurance would result in
lower shipping cargo insurance costs, that is not necessarily
the case. Insurance companies may adjust their rates to pro-
tect themselves against the uncertainty of the liability limits.
Consequently, carriers and shippers may overinsure. Once the
market adjusts to the new liability computation regime, large
carriers may continue to negotiate reasonable rates with in-
surance companies, which will reduce the need for cargo in-
surance and result in an overall rate reduction for shippers.
B. USSR Statement in the UNCITRAL Working Group
in January, 1982
Historically, the USSR has objected to the shift toward use
of SDR's as a unit of account in private law conventions. At
the 1975 Montreal Conference on the Warsaw Convention, the
USSR objected to the dual system for expressing liability lim-
its and voted against the unit of account provisions of the
Montreal Protocols.87 At the 1978 Hamburg Conference, the
USSR abstained from voting on Article 26, the unit of account
clause. In 1982, however, the USSR announced to the Work-
ing Group that it was prepared to abandon the dual system of
Article 26 and perhaps to accept the sole use of the SDR. 5s
The USSR was apparently troubled by the imperfection of
the dual system of calcuiating limits.
THE STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION:
Guided by the task which the Commission entrusted to this
Working Group - namely, "establishing a system for deter-
mining a universal unit of constant value which would serve
as a point of reference in international [transport and liabil-
ity] conventions for expressing amounts in monetary terms" -
' Hamburg Rules, supra note 3, Art. 26(4).
Working Group Report, supra note 4, Annex.
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the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the use for these pur-
poses of the SDR as a unit of account calculated by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund on the basis of a "basket" of the
principal currencies of the capitalist countries. The Soviet
Union assumes, in this connection, that the limits of liability
fixed in these units will, for practical purposes, be converted
into the national currencies of the countries participating in
the conventions, on the basis of their published currency ex-
change rates.
In taking this step, the Soviet Union hopes that it will help
to eliminate the dualism in the methods of calculating liability
under international conventions, a dualism which has per-
sisted until recently since the time when the major capitalist
currencies were backed by gold. This step does not imply any
changes in the Soviet Union's position vis-a-vis IMF, but is an
indication of its desire to find constructive approaches to the
solution of existing international problems in keeping with the
traditions of cooperation which have been established in the
climate of international detente. In the view of the Soviet
Union, the use of the SDR unit of account to express the limit
of liability in international conventions must not encroach on
the basic provisions in the currency legislation of those coun-
tries which are not members of the IMF and which, conse-
quently, do not recognize the SDR as a medium of interna-
tional payments.
One implication that may be drawn from this statement is
that if it were adopted by other non-IMF states, those states
would not rely on the IMF to place a value on their national
currencies. Although they would be prepared to accept inter-
national expression of liability limits in SDR's and would no
longer require a separate system for calculation of liability
limits in monetary units equivalent to specific gold content,
they would continue to require a conversion of SDR's into na-
tional currencies for domestic purposes.9 Therefore, in its re-
port the Working Group recommended to UNCITRAL that
Article 26 be modified to reflect deletion of sections (2) and
UNCITRAL-LIABILITY LIMITS
(3) which set up the alternative method of calculation for non-
IMF states."0
C. UNCITRAL's Action on its Working Group's
Recommendation
Recognizing that elimination of the dual system of calculat-
ing liability limits and adoption of a single measurement, the
SDR, would greatly facilitate and stabilize the liability con-
ventions, UNCITRAL acted swiftly on this issue at its July-
August, 1982 meeting."' The discussion in UNCITRAL con-
firmed that the "preferred unit of account for international
transport and liability conventions, particularly those for
global application, should be the SDR. ' '" 2 Thus, UNCITRAL
decided to accept the recommendation of the Working Group
and proceeded to draft the following new unit of account pro-
vision for the private international law conventions:
UNIVERSAL UNIT OF ACCOUNT
1. The unit of account referred to in article [ ] of this Con-
vention is the Special Drawing Right as defined by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. The amounts mentioned in article [ I
are to be expressed in the national currency of a State accord-
ing to the value of such currency at the date of judgment or on
the date agreed upon by the parties. The equivalence between
the national currency of a Contracting State which is not a
member of the International Monetary Fund and the Special
Drawing Right is to be calculated in a manner determined by
that State.
2. The calculation mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph
1 is to be made in such a manner as to express in the national
currency of the Contracting State as far as possible the same
real value for amounts in article [ ] as is expressed there in
" Id. at 18. "The Working Group decided to recommend to the Commission that it
recommend that in the preparation of future international conventions containing
limitation of liability provisions or in the revision of existing conventions the unit of
account article be substantially in the form of Articie 26, paragraph 1 of the Hamburg
Rules and of paragraph 4, as modifed to the extent necessary by the deletions of
paragraphs 2 and 3."
61 Plenary Report, supra note 5, at 13-15.
" Id. at 15.
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units of account. Contracting States must communicate to the
Depositary the manner of calculation at the time of signature
or when depositing their instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession and whenever there is a change in the
manner of such calculation."
The simplicity of stating that the SDR is the measurement
of liability is appealing. It is additionally important, however,
to require, as paragraph 2 detailed above does, that non-mem-
bers of the IMF express their national currencies in the same
real value as that of SDRs. Otherwise, it would be possible for
such countries to convert their liability limits into a different
national value. The great variety in liability limits under the
Warsaw Convention provides a good example of how conver-
sion into national currencies can differ.
A District of Columbia Circuit case illustrates the stability
that using SDR's affords. In Tramontana v. Varig Airlines,"
Brazil had converted the Warsaw limits into national cur-
rency. Subsequently, to the detriment of U.S. claimants, infla-
tion in Brazil reduced the limit for loss of life down to $170.
The requirement that calculations of local currencies be in a
manner so as to express national currencies in the same real
value as the SDR would prevent a Tramonta deflation of
value from occuring."
II. REMEDIES FOR INFLATION EROSION OF THE LIABILITY
LIMITS
Although liability limits stated in SDR's are not inflation
proof, there is some counter-inflationary effect within the IMF
basket of currencies because the currencies in the basket do
not all inflate at the same time or rate. Varying methods for
remedying the effects of inflation on the limits are found in
transportation conventions. For example, the 1971 Guatemala
Protocol to the Warsaw Convention provides for automatic es-
calation of the liability limits unless contracting states decide
" Plenary Report, supra note 5, Annex I, at 15.
" 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
6" Hamburg Rules, supra note 3, Art. 26(4). Plenary Report, supra note 5, Annex I,
at 15.
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differently at a conference." Other conventions require con-
vening of special review conferences to decide on new limits."
In preparing for the Working Group's meeting in January,
1982, the UNCITRAL Secretariat described various ways of
countering the effects of inflation." One suggestion was to key
the liability limits to the value of one or more baskets of
goods. The limits would vary depending on the values of the
baskets. Thereafter, an international organization such as
UNCITRAL would administer the adjustments effected by
changes in these basket values. Alternatively, the IMF pro-
posed that the liability limits be expressed in SDR's and be
adjusted periodically according to a suitable SDR or other
price index. The IMF suggested that it calculate the monthly
price index, possibly in conjunction with the preparation of
statistics compiled in the IMF publication, International Fi-
nancial Statistics.6"
Another means of adjusting the limits would be to have
treaty amendment conferences triggered by an inflation index.
This adjustment mechanism has the advantage of providing
objective structural means of revising liability limits while
avoiding automatic adjustments. Although indexation might
appear acceptable in transportation conventions, it could be
damaging in other contexts. The U.S. delegate opposed index-
ation because it contributes to inflation and distorts commod-
ity factor prices. Additionally, if the United States were to ac-
quiesce to the indexation concept, it might be interpreted by
other U.N. bodies as a shift in U.S. policy on indexation.
An alternative to indexation would be to set a regular
schedule of liability adjustment conferences. These confer-
ences would permit periodic review of the effect of inflation on
the liability limits. Changes in the design of ships and the na-
" Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Guatemala, 1971, Art. 15, Shawcross & Beaumont,
Air Law A 220-27 (1981).
67 Hamburg Rules, supra note 3, Art. 33. U.N. Convention on International Mul-
timodal Transport of Goods, Geneva, TD/MT/CONF/16, Art. 39 (1980).
e Ui.it of Account of Constant Value, Report of the UNCITRAL Secretary Gen-
eral, supra note 18, at 5-8.
'9 Id. See also note by the IMF staff in A/CN.9/200, 12 May, 1981.
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ture of cargo and carriers could also be examined.
The Working Group agreed that inflation had caused seri-
ous erosion of the liability limits and that such erosion was a
continuing problem.70 Erosion of the liability limits caused by
inflation, undermines the goal of unification of law. The unfa-
vorable effect of inflation has caused courts to find ways to
circumvent eroded limits. The Working Group noted that in-
surance companies meet this ever increasing risk by charging
higher premiums which the carriers in turn pass on to ship-
pers and passengers in the form of higher charges.71
Varying solutions to these problems were presented by the
delegations to the UNCITRAL Working Group.72 The United
States favored adjustment conferences over approaches that
would link the liability limits to the consumer price index or
other indices and sought to persuade the Working Group to
consider only approaches which did not involve indexation."
Because of the support for alternative approaches,74 the
Working Group drafted several samples that reflected the ma-
jor proposed approaches.7 '
A. Indexation Sample
The Working Group discussed the indexation approach
first. The IMF observer reiterated that the IMF was willing to
calculate a monthly price index on the basis of which the lia-
bility limits could be adjusted automatically.76 Underlying
this approach is concern over the effect that changes by the
IMF in its monthly price index might have on liability lim-
its.7 7 The additional issue of whether one general consumer
70 Working Group Report, supra note 4, at 3.
" Id. at 4.
11 Id. at 4-5. Some liability limits were established a long time ago, for example, the
Warsaw limits of 1929. These limits have been severely affected by inflation. The
Working Group could not produce a formula for indexation of such ancient limits to
compensate for erosion.
71 Working Group Report, supra note 4, at 4.
I1 ld. at 5.
" Id. at 14-17.
76 Id. at 6.
77 In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit stated that liability limits should not be
made dependent on "the whim of an international body distinct from the parties to
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price index or different indices tailored to the individual con-
vention's subject matter should be used was also raised. As a
non-member of the IMF, the USSR wanted to permit use of
different indices than the one prepared by the IMF. 8 The
IMF observer stated that a specialized index founded on pri-
mary commodities, would probably fluctuate more than a gen-
eral consumer index. He believed, however, that an index
could be formed for "a particular convention dealing with par-
ticular primary commodities." A separate basket consisting of
those commodities would form the basis for such an index.7
The Working Group recognized that an index could also be
used to convene states to revise conventions if inflation were
to increase by an agreed amount. The amount of any increase
in the liability limits would then be determined by the partici-
pating states.8 0 The Working Group further concluded that li-
ability limits should not fluctuate with changes in an index
but should remain stable for one year periods. Such stability
would enable parties governed by a particular convention to
rely on established limits."' Otherwise, insurance companies
would be unable to identify the amount of risk against which
they were being asked to insure.
The Group presented a text on indexing to UNCITRAL as
one alternative way of adjusting the liability limits for erosion
by inflation.2 The text was adopted by UNCITRAL as one of
two alternative provisions for adjusting liability limits.8 3 In
the discussion preceding adoption of the text, the view was
stated that indexing would in and of itself contribute to infla-
the convention." 690 F.2d at 311. In this regard a commentator recently noted that
the IMF "is a universal intergovernmental organization that is the centerpiece of the
international monetary system, of which the U.S. is one of the principal founding
members." Silard, A Comment on Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
Federal Bar Association Panel on Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
December 7, 1983; I.M.F. Survey, Jan. 10, 1983, at 11-12.
76 Working Group Report, supra note 4, at 5.
79 Id.
" Id. at 10.
8, Id at 9-10.
82 Id.
81 Plenary Report, supra note 5, at 16.
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tion.r States were asked to consider what institution should
be charged with preparation, revision and calculation of such
an index. Some states announced that they would not ratify a
convention containing an indexation provision."s Other states
indicated that there might be some conventions for which the
indexation approach would be desirable, and for that reason
UNCITRAL should prepare a sample price index.8 Conse-
quently, the following text was adopted:
SAMPLE PRICE INDEX
1. The amounts set forth in article [ ] shall be linked to [a
specific price index which might be considered appropriate for
a particular convention]. On coming into force of this [Proto-
col-Convention], the amounts set forth in article [ ] shall be
adjusted by an amount, rounded to the nearest whole number,
corresponding in percentage to the increase or decrease in the
index for the year ending on the last day of December prior to
which this [Protocol-Convention] came into force over its level
for the year ending on the last day of December [of the year in
which the Protocol or Convention was opened for signature].
Thereafter, they shall be adjusted on the first day of July of
each year by an amount, rounded to the nearest whole number,
corresponding in percentage to the increase or decrease in the
level in the index for the year ending on the last day of the
previous December over its level for the prior year.
2.The amounts set forth in article [ ] shall not, however, be
increased or decreased if the ratio of increase or decrease in the
index does not exceed [ ] per cent. Where no adjustment was
made in the previous year because the change was less than [ I
per cent, the comparison shall be made with the level for the
last year on the basis of which an adjustment was made.
3. By the first day of April of each year the Depositary shall
notify each Contracting State and each State which has signed
the [Protocol-Convention] of the amounts to be in force as of
the first day of July following. Changes in the amounts shall be
registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accor-
dance with the General Assembly regulations to give effect to




Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.8"
B. Revision Committee Sample
Adjustment of liability limits by the use of a revision com-
mittee was considered next by the Working Group. The U.S.
delegate suggested that a revision committee be convened at
regular intervals. Provision for emergency meetings that
might be necessitated by sudden changes such as the oil pollu-
tion catastrophes of the 1960's and 1970's would be estab-
lished."8 Both of these ideas were incorporated into the revi-
sion committee sample amendment, which provided that the
depositary would convene a revision committee within five
years after a convention was opened for signature or since the
revision committee last met. The committee could also be ac-
tivated any time upon the request of a specified number of
states.89
The Working Group believed that convening revision com-
mittees would be simpler than convening formal conferences
because liability conventions historically have had such large
participation. A uniform revision procedure for all the trans-
poration conventions was suggested within the Working
Group, because it was thought that a standard revision clause
would promote unification of law. Other Working Group
members favored revision clauses tailored to the specific needs
of each convention.9" One view was that all contracting States
should have the opportunity to participate in the revision
committee's meetings.91 In view of Working Group discussion,
the following text was adopted by UNCITRAL as an alterna-
tive way of adjusting the liability limits:
SAMPLE AMENDMENT PROCEDURE FOR LIMIT OF
LIABILITY
1. The Depositary shall convene a meeting of a Committee
"7 Id. at 16.
Working Group Report, supra note 4, at 10.
" Id. at 14.
90 Id. at 11.
91 Id.
19831
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
composed of a representative from each Contracting State to
consider increasing or decreasing the amounts in article [ I
(a) upon the request of at least [ ] Contracting States, or
(b) when five years have passed since the [Protocol-Conven-
tion] was opened for signature or since the Committee last
met.
2. If the present [Protocol-Convention] comes into force
more than five years after it was opened for signature, the De-
positary shall convene a meeting of the Committee within the
first year after it comes into force.
3. Amendments shall be adopted by the Committee by a []
majority of its members present and voting.92
4. Any amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3
of this article shall be notified by the Depositary to all Con-
tracting States. The Amendment shall be deemed to have been
accepted at the end of a period of [6] months after it has been
notified, unless within that period not less than [one-third] of
the States that were Contracting States at the time of the
adoption of the amendment by the Comittee have communi-
cated to the Depository that they do not accept the amend-
ment. An amendent deemed to have been accepted in accor-
dance with this paragraph shall enter into force for all
Contracting States [121 months after its acceptance.
5. A Contracting State which has not accepted an amend-
ment shall nevertheless be bound by it, unless such State de-
nounces the present Convention at least one month before the
amendment has entered into force. Such denunciation shall
take effect when the amendment enters into force.
6. When an amendment has been adopted by the Committee
but the [6] month period for its acceptance has not yet ex-
pired, a State which becomes a Contracting State to this Con-
vention during that period shall be bound by the amendment if
it comes into force. A State which becomes a Contracting State
to this Convention after that period shall be bound by any
amendment which has been accepted in accordance with para-
graph 4.9
92 Plenary Report, supra note 5, at 16, includes the following asterisk footnote to
the text: "The Conference of Plenipotentiaries may wish to insert a list of criteria to
be taken into account by the Committee." Report of the U.N. Comm. on Int'l Trade
Law, 1st Sess., 26 July-6 Aug., 1982 A/CN.9/230.
8 Plenary Report, supra note 5, at 16-17.
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The sample amendment procedure for liability limits de-
pends on rapid and universal adoption for its success. The ex-
pedited adoption procedures in paragraphs four through six
are based on similar amendment procedures found in the 1980
Convention Concerning International Transport by Rail (CO-
TIF).' This amendment procedure assures universal adoption
of the adjusted liability limits. As illustrated in paragraph
five, it provides for denunciation by any state which cannot
accept a new liability limit which has been adopted under the
amendment procedure of the new clause.' 5 This amendment
procedure raises the issue of tacit amendment of conventions.
For example, action by the U.S. Congress on each specific
amendment would not be required. Under this procedure the
amendment committee will be convened every five years or
upon the request of a certain number of states. Amendments
deemed to have been accepted enter into force for all con-
tracting states within (12) months after their acceptance.
States which have not accepted an amendment are bound by
it unless they denounce the convention at least one month
before the amendment is scheduled to enter into force. Conse-
quently, some states anticipate that they can be bound by the
adjusted liability limits by treaty law regardless of their na-
tional constitutional requirements for treaty adoption and im-
plementation. Recognizing the need for speedy universal
adoption of the adjusted limits, states should be allowed suffi-
cient time to complete their constitutionally required pro-
cess.9' The time allowance, however, should not be long
enough to permit states to be dilatory.
Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), Berne, 1980
(Cmd. 8535). Art. 8 creates the revision commission. The commission's authority to
review proposed amendments is stated in Art. 19. Procedure is provided in Art. 21.
After the revision commission has decided on an amendment, it enters into force for
all contracting states one year after it has been sent to them, unless one third of the
contracting states object within four months after the amendment was sent. However,
it is possible for the contracting states to denounce the convention and thereby avoid
being subject to the amendment.
Id.
R.port of the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) November 1, 1982, 49 Sess. I.M.D. Agenda 8, at 11-12. [hereinafter "Report of
the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization"].
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The 1977 Oil Pollution Convention 97 contains certain crite-
ria for consideration by a revision committee. The Convention
provides that the Committee shall take into account:
(a) any information concerning events causing or likely to
cause pollution damage having a bearing on the objects of this
Convention;
(b) any information on increases and decreases occurring after
the entry into force of this Convention in the costs of goods
and services of the kinds involved in the treatment and reme-
dying of marine oil spillages;
(c) the availability of reliable insurance coverage against the
risk of liability for pollution damage."
In view of this precedent, the Working Group suggested that
similar criteria might be established for the guidance of a re-
vision committee.9 9 Application of such criteria could be re-
quired or, alternatively, simply supplied as a guide for use by
the revision committee.
III. CONCLUSION
UNCITRAL's decision to recommend adoption of the unit
of account provision and the two alternative clauses on ero-
sion of liability limits by inflation was submitted to the
United Nations General Assembly in UNCITRAL's annual re-
port required by General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) of
17 December, 1966. The General Assembly in turn adopted a
resolution'"0 recommending to all U.N. member states that
91 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Explora-
tion for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, London, 1977, Art. 9.
" Id.
" See supra note 92.
100 Provisions for a unit of account and adjustment of limitations of liability
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law:
The General Assembly,
Recognizing that many international transport and liability conventions of both a
global and a regional character contain limitation of liability provisions, wherein the
limitation of liability is expressed in a unit of account,
Noting that the amount fixed in such a convention as the limitation of liability may
become seriously affected over time by changes in monetary values, thereby destroy-
ing the intended balance of the convention as adopted,
Believing that a preferred unit of account for many conventions, particularly for
UNCITRAL-LIABILITY LIMITS
they adopt the new unit of account provision and the alterna-
tive provisions for adjusting liability limits for inflation ero-
sion in future liability conventions or in revision of the ex-
isting conventions.
Still at issue is whether states will accept the UNCITRAL
and General Assembly recommendations. The first opportu-
nity to react to these recommendations was at the October,
1982 meeting of the Legal Committee of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), which has several maritime
conventions under consideration. 101 The IMO Legal Commit-
tee concluded that the indexation system would not be suita-
ble for amendment of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention or
for the 1971 Fund Convention. 102 The Legal Committee ob-
served that it would be difficult to agree upon an appropriate
index which would be suitable for both of these conven-
tions.103 Furthermore, it was noted that an inflation index
would be limited to changes in inflation and could not be used
to make other needed adjustments; such a system could not
those of global application, should be the special drawing right as determined by the
International Monetary Fund,
Being of the opinion that the conventions should, in any event, contain a provision
which would facilitate the adjustment of the limit of liability to changes in monetary
values,
Taking into consideration any preferential agreements between the States concerned,
Noting that the United Nations Commission on International Trade law has adopted
a provision for a universal unit of account for expressing monetary amounts in inter-
national transport and liability conventions and two alternative provisions for the
adjustment of limits of liability in such conventions,
(1.) Recommends that in the preparation of future international conventions contain-
ing limitation of liability provisions or in the revision of existing conventions, the unit
of account provision as adopted by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law should be used;
(2.) Recommends further that in such conventions one of the two alternative provi-
sions for adjustment of the limitation of liability as adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law should be used. Official Records of the Gen-
eral Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/37/17 and Corr .1 - E
only), para. 63.
101 See supra note 95.
102 Report of the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization,
supra note 96, at 10. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 2. International Convention on Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284.
101 Report of the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization,
supra note 96 at 10.
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be controlled by the contracting states."0 4
The amendment procedure presented by UNCITRAL was
strongly supported by several delegations that noted the need
for swift updating and for achievement of complete uniform-
ity among all contracting states regarding amounts of the
amended liability limits.1 0 5 These delegations noted that fail-
ure to obtain universal application of amended limits would
encourage forum shopping for jurisdictions with the lowest
limitation amounts.1°0 Generally they approved of the UNCI-
TRAL proposal for adoption or denunciation of new limits. 0 7
One delegation stated that problems with obtaining parlia-
mentary approval of new limits could be mitigated if a suffi-
ciently long time between adoption and implementation were
provided. 10 8 Finally, the IMO Legal Committee supported use
of SDR's to express limitation amounts. 09
Action on implementation of the UNCITRAL recommenda-
tions affecting air liability conventions normally takes place in
ICAO, where amendments to aviation treaties are prepared. 10
As of this writing, the issue has not been raised in ICAO.
When the issue is considered, ICAO will probably look to the
discussion concerning the UNCITRAL recommendations by
the IMO Legal Committee and by other organizations which
are responsible for treaties with monetary limits. Certainly,
the UNCITRAL recommendations would stabilize the mea-
surement of limits and counter erosion to the liability limits
in the Warsaw Convention caused by inflation. These recom-
mendations would remedy the maladies in the private interna-
tional law conventions, as discussed in Franklin Mint."'
The UNCITRAL recommendations for amendments would
resolve problems that are common to many transportation
104 Id.
:" Id. at 11.
00 Id.
107 Id.
I" Id. at 12.
10 Id.
See supra note 21.
See supra note 47.
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conventions. 1 2 Although these treaties establish limits, there
have been problems in defining these limits, and the limits
have been eroded by inflation. UNCITRAL's concern with fa-
cilitating international trade law in general might make it the
best forum for providing a common solution to these problems
in all these treaties. The unique subject matter of each treaty
would require some modification, and possibly not all treaties
would fit comfortably into a common UNCITRAL solution.
This is the juncture, however, at which UNCITRAL should
decide whether to draft a separate convention on units of ac-
count and inflation erosion.11 8 A separate convention would
have the following advantages:
1. It generally would insure against re-opening private inter-
national law treaties for renegotiation.
2. An UNCITRAL convention would establish uniformity of
law in an important international trade area.
3. An UNCITRAL solution could be drafted quickly because
UNCITRAL has done the preparatory work in the
recommendations.
4. An UNCITRAL solution would be more cost effective be-
cause it would not involve convening the legal committees
of the many specialized agencies separately. " "
Whether specialized U.N. agencies, such as ICAO and IMO,
consider the U.N. General Assembly recommendations 11
piecemeal or UNCITRAL itself undertakes a common treaty
solution, it is important that the UNCITRAL recommenda-
tions be iinplemented as soon as possible.
ANNEX A.
TRANSPORT AND LIABILITY CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS TO
SUCH CONVENTIONS WHICH USE THE SDR FOR THE UNIT OF
113 See Annex A.
,13 The modus operandi would be that later treaty obligations would supercede
prior treaty obligations, Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, Art. 30, May 22,
1969, 8 I.L.M. 679.
14 See supra note 99.
I* Supra note 99.
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ACCOUNT
Conventions
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims,
London, 19 November 1976.
European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Per-
sonal Injury and Death, Strasbourg, 27 January 1977.
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Re-
sulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed
Mineral Resources, London, 1 May 1977.
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea,
1978 (Hamburg Rules), Hamburg, 31 March 1978.
Convention Relative aux Transports Internationaux Fer-
roviaires (COTIF), Berne, 9 May 1980.
United Nations Convention on International Multimodal
Transport of Goods, Geneva, 24 May 1980.
Protocols
Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Mon-
treal, 25 September 1975 (Protocols No. 2 and 3 introduced
the SDR as the unit of account into the Convention as
amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 Septem-
ber 1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971. Protocol
No. 4 made substantive amendments to the Convention as
amended by the Protocol done at The Hague and also in-
troduced the use of the SDR).
Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, London, 19 November 1976
Protocol to the International Convention on the Establish-
ment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1971, London, 19 November 1976.
Protocol to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974, London, 19 No-
vember 1976.
Protocol to the Convention on the Contract for the Interna-
tional Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Inland Wa-
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terway (CVN), Geneva, 5 July 1978.
Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Limitation of the
Liability of Owners of Inland Navigation Vessels (CLN),
Geneva, 5 July 1978.
Protocol to the Convention on the Contract for the Interna-
tional Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), Geneva, 5 July
1978.
Protocol to the Convention on the Contract for the Interna-
tional Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Road (CVR),
Geneva, 5 July 1978.
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Damage Caused by
Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface signed at
Rome on 7 October 1952, Montreal, 23 September 1978.
Protocol Amending the International Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading,
25 August 1924 as Amended by the Protocol of 23 February
1968, Brussels, 21 December 1979.
Protocol Amending the International Convention Relating to
the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships
dated 10 October 1957, Brussels, 21 December 1979.
ANNEX B.
Article 26. Unit of Account
1. The unit of account referred to in article 6 of this Conven-
tion is the Special Drawing Right as defined by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. The amounts mentioned in article 6
are to be converted into the national currency of a State
according to the value of such currency at the date of judg-
ment or the date agreed upon by the parties. The value of a
national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of
a Contracting State which is a member of the International
Monetary Fund is to be calculated in accordance with the
method of valuation applied by the International Monetary
Fund in effect at the date in question for its operations and
transactions. The value of a national currency in terms of
the Special Drawing Right of a Contracting State which is
not a member of the International Monetary Fund is to be
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calculated in a manner determined by that State.
2. Nevertheless, those States which are not members of the
International Monetary Fund and whose law does not per-
mit the application of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this
article may, at the time of signature, or at the time of ratifi-
cation, acceptance, approval or accession or at any time
thereafter, declare that the limits of liability provided for in
this Convention to be applied in their territories shall be
fixed as: 12,500 monetary units per package or other ship-
ping unit or 37.5 monetary units per kilogramme of gross
weight of the goods.
3. The monetary unit referred to in paragraph 2 of this article
corresponds to sixty-five and a half milligrammes of gold of
millesimal fineness nine hundred. The conversion of the
amounts referred to in paragraph 2 into the national cur-
rency is to be made according to the law of the State
concerned.
4. The calculation mentioned in the last sentence of para-
graph 1 and the conversion mentioned in paragraph 3 of
this article are to be made in such a manner as to express in
the national currency of the Contracting State as far as pos-
sible the same real value for the amounts in article 6 as is
expressed there in units of account. Contracting States
must communicate to the depository the manner of calcula-
tion pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article or the result of
the conversion mentioned in paragraph 3 of this article as
the case may be at the time of signature or when depositing
their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or ac-
cession, or when availing themselves of the option provided
for in paragraph 2 of this article and whenever there is a
change in the manner of such calculation or in the result of
such conversion.
